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POLITICAL BARRIERS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF MONET ARY POLICY 




The New England antebellum banking market was examined to understand the interaction 
of political ideology and economic forces. With each state controlling bank entry, hence 
the money supply, political ideology could impede the supply of money within a state. 
However, the monetary forces from neighboring states may have influenced the degree to 
which parties held true to their political ideology. The results indicate that political 
ideology was an effective barrier in two of the six states, while three states were responsive 
to neighbor states' monetary policy regardless of political ideology. These states 
responded by creating new banks, raising existing capital levels, or doing both. 
INTRODUCTION 
The antebellum banking was a unique period of banking history where each 
individual state not only determined its own bank regulatory structure, but also determined 
the nature, level, and growth of its own money supply. In some states, banks received the 
privilege of incorporation, authorization to issue bank notes, operated under a general 
banking code, and entered freely into the market as needed. In other states, legislatures 
would issue specialized corporate charters that authorized banks to issue bank notes, but 
would determine who and how many banks could enter the market. While other states 
strictly prohibited bank incorporation and note issue. 1 The wide range of regulatory 
structures can be traced, in part, to the cultural forces of business enterprises and political 
ideology of the majority party in office. As Bray Hammond (1957) noted 
" ... the monetary funds that the banks provided were commonly in the form of 
their own circulating notes, handed over the counter to the borrower, and the 
expansion of the circulating medium was the palpable and visible aspect of the 
expansion of credit. Everyone recognized that the more banks lent, the more 
there was. That is why they {banks} were a political issue. That is why they were 
denounced by Thomas Jefferson . .. and ... why most Americans esteemed them." 
(viii-ix) 
Although the political ideology of the majority party shaped the regulatory 
structure, most analysis of the antebellum banking market has assumed that the political 
institutional structure was external to the market outcome. Little has been done empirically 
to examine how economic forces may have shaped the antebellum political process or how 
the political process may have impacted the antebellum economic outcome.2 The purpose 
of this paper is twofold: first, did economic forces external to a state influence the banking 
policy of that state; and second, did the political nature within a state impede the economic 
process. 
To test these hypotheses, we examine the New England antebellum banking 
market for two reasons.3 First, New England was the only region-wide banking market 
where bank notes circulated at par (face) value. Since the system allowed bank notes to 
travel and circulate among the states at par, the entry/monetary policy of one state could 
potentially impact the banking market and policies of a neighboring state. Second, the 
New England states had a wide variety ofregulatory structures and political ideologies. 
Three states maintained dual-banking systems where banks could enter either by receiving 
a legislative charter or enter under a free banking law. The remaining three states 
maintained the exclusive legislative approval process; two states held strong legislative 
oversight while the other appeared to be de facto free banking. 
This study will proceed as follows. In Section II an overview of the political 
ideology of each party and of each state is presented. In Section III, the theoretical model 
of competitive bank entry is given. The evidence and concluding remarks are presented in 
Section IV. 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND BANK ENTRY 
Two major political parties controlled the governor's office in New England 
between 1836-1855: the Democrats and the Whigs.4 After 1855, the Republican and 
American (Know-Nothing) parties were the prominent parties in the office. The attitudes 
of the Democrats and Whigs towards banking can be defined, in part, by their positions on 
the role of government in the market place. 5 The attitudes that helped define the 
Republican and American parties towards banking are less clear. Some historians have 
asserted that they defined themselves based on social issues and less on economic policy.6 
Democrats 
Two main factions vied for control within the Democrat party: the Conservatives 
and the Jacksonian Hard Currency advocates (also known as the Radicals or Locofocos).7 
Conservative Democrats were willing to support the current form of banking with 
legislative oversight; many of the Conservative Democrats were bankers themselves. The 
current system required a group of citizens to petition the legislature in order to receive the 
right to operate a bank and to receive the special privileges of a banking corporation. As a 
corporation the bank would be privileged to issue paper currency (bank notes) and the 
stockholders would receive limited liability. The charters were individually crafted bills 
voted upon by the legislature and signed into law by the governor. 
The populist Jacksonian Hards were critical of the process because it allowed the 
legislature to grant exclusive privileges to selected individuals. They argued that banking 
should be available to anyone in the public willing to commit resources to the enterprise. 
Furthermore, they believed that banking should be based on "hard" (metallic) currency and 
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not paper currency (bank notes), and that the legislature should not give special privileges 
such as limited liability or the right to issue paper currency. 
Although the Hards gained strength in several legislatures after the 183 7 banking 
crisis, political realities prevented the Hards in the Democratically strong New England 
states from obtaining their ideal ofa lassiez faire system.8 Consequently, the Hards 
pursued two reforms, which would gain some support from their Conservative colleagues. 
One of these reforms focused on limiting the bank note issue.9 These regulations not only 
limited note issue, but also reduced the profitability of operating a bank. In addition to 
regulating operations, the Hards pursued reforms that provided greater access to bank 
charters to the public. They would either freely approve charter petitions or enact a law 
that allowed entry without legislative approval. This approach was known as the free 
banking laws. 10 Some have contended that the free banking approach of the Hards may 
have reduced the political barriers, but also raised economic barriers. 11 Complying with 
the provisions of the law made it difficult to compete with a chartered bank. 
Whigs 
The Whig Party was formed between 1834-1836 by those who opposed Andrew 
Jackson's more radical anti-government, anti-bank ideology. According to Michael Holt, 
the Whigs sought ways to enlarge their coalition by drawing in Conservative Democrats 
who supported "positive legislation to expand credit and the money supply, [and who] 
promote private investment by giving tariff protection to manufactures and by limited 
stockholder liability ... " 12 For the Whigs, granting exclusive privilege by the legislature 
was necessary to promote economic growth. As Van Duesen (1973) observed, the Whigs 
"wanted well-conducted banks, a well-regulated paper currency, and sound cautious fiscal 
policies." (p348) A "well-regulated" currency did not include free banking type reforms. 
Overview of State Parties and Bank Entry 
New England's political landscape took the form ofa mosaic where five of the six 
states were dominated by one party (until 1855) with each state taking a slightly different 
approach to banking; only in one state - Connecticut - no particular party dominated the 
governor's office. (See Table 1 for a summary of the years a political party held the 
governor's office.) Two of the states were Democratic strongholds: Maine and New 
Hampshire. In Maine, the Democrat-lead state appeared to be a de facto free banking state 
by liberally approving charters.13 From 1836 to 1859 the state legislature approved 115 
charters, 39 of which never went into operations. 14 The New Hampshire Democrat Party 
attempted to pass a free banking law several times between 1839 and 1844 without 
success. (Smith, p 218) Since free banking reform was unsuccessful, they pursued 
policies that restricted note issue. (Cole, pl92-193.) 
The Whig party dominated Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The 
cautious, deliberate approach of the Whigs in Massachusetts can be seen in the Joint 
Standing Committee Report on Banks and Banking (1853) where they outline the criteria 
for granting a request. The Democrats made little headway in Massachusetts. They were 
able to capture the office for four terms; in 1840, 1843 and 1851-1852. During their short 
tenure in the 1850's a free banking law was passed. Rhode Island had a string of Whig 
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Governors until 1851 when they elected a Democratic Governor. They held the office 
until 1854 when the Whigs returned to the office. In Vermont, the Whigs held the office 
expect for one term in 1853-1854. Uncharacteristically, the Whigs passed a free banking 
law in 1851. With a legislature continuing to issue charters, and with strong opposition to 
the free banking law by the banking commissioners, few banks entered under the law. 15 
Connecticut was the only state where the Democrats and Whigs held the same 
number of terms in office. During a Democrat's term, the legislature passed a Free 
Banking Law in 1852. Two years later when the Whigs ousted the Democrat and the 
legislature started to issue charters again. They brought an end to free banking when they 
repealed the law in 1856. Unlike the Vermont experience, Connecticut experienced a large 
increase of banks after the enactment of the law. 
From this review, it appears that in some cases the Democrats were successful in 
legislating their political ideology by implementing free banking reform or establishing a 
system that appeared to be de facto free banking. The Whigs, on the other hand, 
maintained legislative oversight and access to the market. The ideological positions 
suggest, in the absence of a free banking law, that Whigs would be more willing to grant 
charters than the Democrats. 
The regulatory approach of the Democrats therefore would result in slower rates 
of growth in bank entry than that seen under the Whigs, unless the Democrats enacted a 
free banking law or followed an open access approach to entry. In Democrat states that 
enacted free banking legislation or followed free access, entry rates are expected to grow at 
a faster rate than those in a Whig state. It appears from a review of the annual net entry 
rates of the period (See Figure 1) there is no clear evidence that net entry differ by 
particular party. Democrats had higher rates of net entry than Whig Governors in four of 
the six states: they were slightly higher in Vermont, and Connecticut, and significantly 
higher rates in Maine and Rhode Island. The higher rates in Vermont, Connecticut, and 
Maine could be as a result of Democrats who supported free banking/access reform 
policies. The Whigs had significantly higher rates in New Hampshire and slightly higher 
rates in Massachusetts. The difference in New Hampshire could have been due to the 
hard-line regulatory approach of the ruling Democrats. Although Massachusetts enacted a 
free banking law, it appears that it did not create greater access than that which entered 
while the Whigs were in control. 
THEORY OF ENTRY RA TES AND POLITICAL BARRIERS 
Although there appears to be differences in net entry rates within each state due to 
political ideology, this does not necessarily show whether the political parties were barriers 
to economic growth within the states or whether they were moved by economic forces 
from outside the state or. Internal market conditions may have coincided with the party 
that was elected into office. The evidence in Figure 1 does not help us determine whether 
regional economic forces influenced the state banking/monetary policy. 
Furthermore, net entry does not necessarily indicate the approach a political party 
may take to increase their bank capital and expand money supply. Some parties may have 
elected to increase the money supply through enlarging established banks instead of 
authorizing the establishment of a new bank through a charter. Where there was political 
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resistance to new banks, legislators could accommodate the market by increasing banking 
capital of existing banks. The charters issued by New England states would typically 
stipulate the exact amount of the capital that could be raised by the owners. Most charters 
would give the owners one year to raise the amount of capital needed. If unsuccessful, the 
petitioners would have to return to the legislature the next year and request an extension 
and/or reduction in the minimum amount of capital. Banks holding a charter would also 
require legislative approval to increase their capital. 16 The reasons for granting charters 
instead of enlarging the bank were varied, some of which may have been based on the 
political ideology of the ruling party. 17 
Figure 1. 





Since entry of bank capital could take two forms, two models of bank capital in a 
competitive market are examined. The first model presents the competitive level of total 
bank capital in the market as developed by Peltzman (1970), Throop (1975) and Dwyer 
(1981). The second model examines the competitive entry rate of banks in the market as 
developed by Peltzman ( 1965).18 Although these studies have examined the national 
banking market, they provide the basis for our modeling of capital formation within an 
antebellum state. The desired equilibrium level of capital stock (C.i1) is a function of the 
level of deposits within a state (Dj1), the expected return on bank capital (Rei1) , and the level 
of regional banking activity of neighboring states (RBj1): 
(1) 
In a competitive market, we would expect that the level of desired capital would 
increase with the level of deposits within the state. Depositors view capital as a measure of 
security and would demand more capital from a bank as deposits increase. As in typical 
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markets, an increase in expected profitability will lead to an increase the desired level of 
capital. 
Finally, a variable was added to capture the interstate effects of bank entry. New 
England was the only region where bank notes from different New England States 
circulated at par. Since the system allowed bank notes to travel and circulate among the 
states at par, entry within one state could potentially have an effect on another state ' s 
monetary system. If out-of-state bank notes are near-perfect substitutes for in-state bank 
notes, an increase in competition from out-of-state banks could potentially decrease the 
desired level of bank capital within a state. In New England where the Suffolk system 
operated, we would expect that out-of-state notes would circulate equally with in-state 
bank notes. 
Entry of capital within a state occurs when the actual stock of capital deviates 
from the desired stock of capital. Thus, the actual rate of change of capital per unit of time 
for state j is 
lnCit - lnCi1-1 = A.(lnc·it - lnCi1-1), (2) 
where lnc·it denotes the logarithm of the desired flow for bank capital and A. denotes the 
coefficient of adjustment. Substituting equation (1) into equation (2), the actual rate of 




Thus, capital accumulation in the banking market is a function of market forces and last 
period's level of capital. 
The desired level of capital also provides the basis for the theory of entry into the 
market. Peltzmen ( 1965) has provided a simple model that identifies the variables that 
would determine bank entry in a competitive market. By definition, bank capital per bank 
for the jth state in time period t (Sj1) is equal to total capital (Cj1) divided by the total 
number of banks (Bj1): 
Sit= C/Bit· (5) 
The rate of change in the number of banks can be found by differentiating equation (5) 
with respect to time, 
_1 dB1 = .l dCj - _l_ dS1 
Bit-1 dt Cit-1 dt Sit-1 dt 
(6) 
By definition, the rate of change in the number of banks is equal to the rate of net entry 
(NER): 




where E is the entry rate, M is the merger rate, and X is the exit rate. 19 Substituting 
equation ( 6) into (7) we have 
NERit = ...l dq - J_ dSj 
dCit-i dt Sit-i dt 
(8) 
Thus, equation (8) states that the net entry rate in the market will increase with the 
increased rate of total capital accumulation and will decease with the percentage increase 
in average capital size. 
From our capital accumulation model above, substituting equation (3) into (7), we 
find that net entry rate is equal to 
NERit = /... [h(lnDii. lnReit, lnRBj1)] - lnCii-i] - J_ dSi (8) 
Sit-1 
Thus, the competitive model predicts that net entry is a positive function of deposits, and 
regional banking activity, and inversely related to the rate ofreturn on alternative 
investments, lagged capital, and the growth in capital per bank. 
The competitive model may have been representative of entry in "free banking 
states", but not necessarily in the chartering states. In a chartering system where the 
Governor is the gatekeeper of entry, the political ideology of the governor may have 
created a barrier to entry. As noted above, in some cases, a state may have become more 
open or closed as a new political party gained the governor's seat. Furthermore, ifthe 
party was slow to issue charters the monetary policies of neighboring states may influence 
entry decisions. If legislators are slow in providing the desired level of capital, in-state 
bank activity could increase as neighboring state banking activity increases. Legislators 
may listen to "good reason" from petitioners requesting additional capital or incorporating 
a new bank if neighboring state banks are intruding into their state. Such were the 
arguments made by Massachusetts's petitioners.20 Thus, we would expect a positive 
relationship between in-state banking capital and neighboring banking activity if the state 
did not provide sufficient capital to meet the in-state needs and was responsive to the in-
state petitioners. 
Finally, chartering states may have signaled a shifted in banking policy by 
enacting new legislation. Several New England states enacted a free banking law that 
allowed entry without legislative approval; they also continued to issue charters. In these 
dual banking states, legislators - no matter what their party affiliation - may have signaled 
the market that they would be "more" willing to issue charters; thus, lowering a political 
barrier.21 
THE EVIDENCE ON ENTRY RATES 1836-1859 
Overview 
Entry data were compiled from various state bank condition reports and the 1876 
Report of the Comptroller of Currency. From these reports the number of banks and bank 
balance sheet information was collected for the period 1836 to 1859.22 From the 
Congressional Quarterly, the party of the Governor was determined. Three major parties 
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were at some point in the states' governor' s seat: Democrat, Whig, and Republican 
parties.23 
We first examine the averages of net entry rates for four-year periods. 24 If 
markets were completely independent and manipulated by political ideology we would 
expect a random display of entry rates across states. The data, however, shows a strong 
correlation of entry among the New England States. (See Figure 2.) As a benchmark, the 
net entry of New York is given as well . (New York maintained a free banking system 
from 1838 to the Civil War.) In Figure 2, it appears that the New England States net entry 
patterns were markedly different than New York during the early l 840's, but moved with 
New York in 1846 and thereafter. 
Figure 2 
Net Entry Rates of New England States 
Four Year Periods: 1837-1959 
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The period between 1837 and 1841 showed only one New England State - RI - with an 
increase in entry activity. While New England showed a decline, New York showed a 
positive growth in the number of banks during the early years of free banking. Over the 
next four year period, entry activity continued on average to decline in most New England 
States, while NY continued to showed a strong increase and CT showed only a slight 
increase in entry. In general, we find recovery in the region with positive growth between 
1847 and 1854. Only Maine showed a decline in the first period, but appeared to have 
recovered strongly between 1851-54. During the latter part of the decade, all states 
showed a slow downturn in net entry rates with Maine showing a decline in the total 
number of banks. This movement suggests an integrated market, free from political 
ideology . . 
In Figure 3, the rate of capital accumulation in New England and New York for 












Capital Accumulation Rates of New England States 
Four Year Periods: 1837-1859 
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The pattern of capital accumulation rates in New England is very similar to that of the net 
entry, and it appears that New England followed closely the rate of capital accumulation of 
New York. With growth rates of new entrants approximately equal to the growth in 
capital, this would suggest that the bank entry policies of the New England States were 
primarily conducted through the issuance of charters and not through the enlargement of 
existing banks. While in NY with entry rates higher than rates of capital accumulation, it 
appears that banking became more accessible, but smaller than their New England 
counterpart. 
There is some support for this observation. In Figure 4, growth in capital per 
bank was, in general, very low throughout the period. In very few cases do we find four-
year growth rates above 2%, and only one state - Rhode Island - showed growth in capital 













State by State Analysis 
Figure 4 
Percent Change in Capital Per Bank 








The pattern of net entry rates and capital accumulation suggests that the New 
England market was integrated and that the state legislatures may have been influenced by 
economic forces rather than political ideology. To rigorously test this assertion, we test the 
following general models for each state: 25 
NEit = ao + a1 Inn•• jt + a 2 lnR1_1 + a 3 lnRBNit-l + a4 lnCj1-1 +as Sit+ a 6 Demit+ a 1 Repit + 
a 8 FBLi1 +lJi" and 
lnCit = Po+ P1 lnDsa jt + P2 lnR,_1 + p3 lnRBNit-l + p4 lnCj1-1 + P6 Demit+ P1 Repit + Ps 
FBLjt +Ejt. 
The measure for bank deposits (n•• ) for state j in time period t is the total seasonally-
adjusted bank credits in the state which is equal to bank deposits plus bank notes.26 A 
proxy for the expected rate ofreturn in time period t (R01) is the commercial paper rate in 
the Boston financial market lagged one period.27 A proxy for regional bank activity 
(RBNit-l ) is the number of bank notes issued by neighboring states lagged one period.28 
Due to the chartering process capital formation would take at most a year to respond to 
regional activity. Sit is the growth in assets per bank. Assets per bank measures both the 
impact of capital per bank as well as economies of scale effects on net entry. It is 
expected that bank deposits, and the expected return, will be positively related to both net 
entry and capital accumulation. The sign on regional banking activity will depend on the 
degree of political barriers. Net entry is expected to be negatively related to the growth in 
assets per bank. The coefficient of adjustments of capital to desired levels of capital is 
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denoted by the coefficients a 4 and ~4• where a 4 is expected to be negative and ~4 is 
expected to be positive. Two dummy variables representing the political party in the 
governor's office were created: Democrat and Republican. (The intercept would therefore 
represent influence of the Whig Party.) Each New England State held annual 
gubernatorial elections. Due to the legislative process, we assume that net entry will be 
impacted the year after the term of office. The coefficient is expected to be negative for 
Democrats and uncertain for Republicans. Finally, a dummy variable was also created 
taking on a value of one for the years that a free banking law was in effect in that state. 
In Table 2, the results of the regression for the New England States and New 
York are given. New York is given as the benchmark for a competitive system and does 
not include any of the dummy variables. In general, it appears that the results support the 
basic model. The coefficients that are significant have the expected signs. Commercial 
paper rates were positive and significant in determining the net entry rates in two states 
(Massachusetts and Connecticut); although commercial paper rates did not impact New 
York net entry rates. The use of the Boston commercial paper rates may not have reflected 
the expected profits in the New York Market. In most of the state models the level of 
deposits and the percentage change in assets per bank have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. 
The impact of regional activity on monetary policy of the states yielded mixed 
results. Five of the seven states had negative coefficients with only three of the coefficients 
being statistically significant: Maine, Connecticut, and New York. In Massachusetts, net 
entry rates increased when regional notes increased. The positive coefficient implies that 
the Massachusetts legislature was consistently responding to regional growth and was not 
accommodating the state banking needs. 29 
Net entry rates, in most states, were not influenced by political ideology. In only 
two states do we find party affiliation of the Governor having a significant impact on net 
entry. When the Democrats held the governor's office in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, 
we find net entry rates influenced. In Massachusetts net entry declined while in Rhode 
Island net entry increased. 
The decline in Massachusetts could be linked to the enactment of the Free 
Banking Law. In 1851 and 1852, a Democrat held the governor's office and was able to 
push through a free banking Jaw. At the same time, the legislature approved an increase of 
bank capital over $5 million - $1.25 million in capital from seven new charters and $3 .9 
million to existing banks; an increase of 13%. In 1852, no new banks entered under the 
new law nor were chartered by the legislature. The return of a Whig governor prompted 
the legislature to evaluate the effectiveness of the free banking law since there was little 
interest in establishing a free bank, but significant interest in establishing chartered banks. 
The majority report recommended the repeal of the law and the return to the issuance of 
charters.30 Even though the law remained on the books, the legislature appeared to shifted 
its entry policy and started to issue more charters - as noted by the positive coefficient on 
the free banking law coefficient which was significant at the 86% confidence level. 
Rhode Island also found itself with a Democrat Governor in 1851. Between 1836 
and 1851, only 4 charters were issued by the legislature. The Democrat platform of greater 
access seemed to have been implemented as evidenced by the fourteen new banks that 
entered the market during the Democrats' three years in office. Rhode Island was also the 
only state where net entry was significantly changed during the period when the 
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Republican Party was in office. The observed decline may have been a coincidence. The 
first Republican took office in 1856, the year before the Panic of 1857. Many of the 
charters issued in the l 850's were issued to stockholders of manufacturing firms whose 
distinct purpose was to take over corporate obligations.31 The fall of the firms from the 
panic lead to the failure of 15 banks - over 15% of the banks. Although new charters were 
issued after the panic, they never reached their pre-panic level. 
Thus, it appears that most of the chartering states managed entry such that 
neighboring state activity did not impact in-state profitability nor did it stir residents to 
increase petitions for bank capital. For those states that were relatively free, neighboring 
state's note issue did impact the profitability of in-state banks; an increase in bank notes 
form neighboring states lowered net entry rates. Political ideology seems to be a 
significant influence in two states, thus creating barriers to entry. Although three states 
signaled shifts in entry policy with the enactment of a free banking law, there appears to be 
no sustainable change in entry policy. 
Table 3 presents the results of the capital accumulation model. Like the net entry 
model the coefficients of the basic competitive model have the expected signs, many of 
which are statistically significant. We do, however, find several states consistently 
changing the level of capital in response to neighboring state bank activity. Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island and Connecticut all showed a positive responsive to changes in bank notes 
issue by neighboring states. Massachusetts was the only state that increased both the 
number of banks and the rate of capital accumulation when regional notes increased. This 
result is not surprising since Massachusetts was the home of the Suffolk Bank, and would 
be acutely aware of the bank note flows of the region. The Rhode Island result suggests 
that Rhode Island may have had a preference for increasing capital instead of issuing 
charters regardless of who held the governor's office. Connecticut's results may be a 
result of it's proximity to New York City and the reputation of the Suffolk Banking 
System. As New York's n·otes entered Connecticut, petitioners sought and won approval 
for new capital from the legislature. Thus, high periods of regional bank notes encouraged 
increased demand for Connecticut bank capital. 
It appears that political ideology did not present a barrier to capital accumulation. 
Only in Maine while the Republicans were in office was there a significant shift in capital 
accumulation rates. During their brief tenure, capital declined 16% on average. In those 
states where political barriers limited net entry, we find that they did not create a barrier to 
the inflow of capital. This suggests that it may have been more politically acceptable to 
limit entry and to increase capital levels of existing banks. 
Finally, we find that the enactment of the free bank law resulted in a shift in bank 
policy in Massachusetts. After the law was enacted there was a significant increase in 
capital accumulation holding all other factors constant - including political ideology. Thus, 
when the Democrats left the office in 1852, the Whigs and the American Party continued 
to increase the capital at a rate greater than prior to the enactment. 
SUMMARY 
During the antebellum period, state legislatures of New England, through their 
control of bank charters and bank capital, were effectively controlling the monetary policy 
of the state. The banking market within the region was also highly integrated with the 
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establishment of the Suffolk Bank which allowed bank notes (currency) to exchanged at 
face value. Under this system, we could observe how economic forces through the 
monetary policies of neighboring states influenced the political/monetary policies of a 
particular state. The options facing legislators were either increasing the rate of banking 
capital, increasing the rate of new competitors, or both. We find that that legislative 
process imposed some barriers in certain states. 
The data indicates that three of the states - Mass., R.I. , CT. - responded to the 
monetary policies of neighboring states by either increasing the number of banks or capital 
when regional bank notes increased. These results suggest that the legislators of these 
states were limiting entry and responded to the demands of the petitioners regardless of the 
party that held the governor's office. 
The notion that political ideology would impact the banking policies of the period 
is supported in two of the three states - Mass. and R.1.- that responded to regional bank 
notes. In these two states the political influence was strongly associated with the issue of 
bank charters, not with the adjustment in capital. A third state - Maine - showed a decline 
in capital when the Republicans held office, but no change in the issuance of bank charters. 
Finally, the public sentiment may have been poised for the shift in bank policy as 
a number of states - Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont - were willing to enact free 
banking laws. 32 Only in Massachusetts do we find a significant increase in bank capital 
after the free banking law. 
The result raises new questions about the impact of the legislative process on the 
banking market. Since the legislatures screened petitioners, and in some cases limited the 
amount of capital in the market, did the legislative process also distort the allocation of 
bank capital? Were the legislators willing to accept the petitioner's location requests or 
were there certain regions that benefited from those that were connected with the political 
leadership? The legislative process, though appearing to be free, may have been 
allocatively inefficient. 
ENDNOTES 
Richard Sylla ( 1985) reviews the development of antebellum incorporation law 
and makes a distinction between free banking and free bank incorporation. 
2 Douglas North (1990) rightly contends that political rules and institutions leads to 
economic outcomes, but the feedback of economic outcomes leads to a 
modification of the political rule. (P48). 
3 Preliminary evidence on interstate effects was found by Economopoulos and 
O'Neill ( 1995). They showed that states that issued charters increased the entry 
rate of banks at the same time when a number of states enacted free banking laws. 
They were unable to determine whether there was any direct interstate effect of 
the free banking laws. 
4 An examination of the party in the governor's office and majority party in 
legislature is beyond the scope of this study. The governor represents the 
gatekeeper of all legislation and should provide a good proxy for examining 
political barriers. 
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5 In The Market Revolution in American ( 1996) Michael Holt makes the assertion 
that "most historians" agree to this point. He cites empirical evidence that after 
the depression of 1837, the Whigs and Democrats held sharply divergent position 
on the role of government in the market place.(p.224-229) 
6 Holt(l996) presents Eric Foner's argument that the Republican and American 
parties were the coalition of ex-Democrats and ex-Whigs who rallied around key 
social issues. Leaders of these parties avoided positions on economic issues. (pp. 
232-233) 
7 This review is a summary of following works: Lamoreaux ( 1994) pages 35-51, 
Cole (1970) pages 185-215, and Formisano (1983) pp 268-301. 
8 In the Whig strong states, they were able to gain some leverage to accomplish 
some of their programs. 
9 Lamoreaux (p.42) explains this apparent inconsistency. If they could not 
eliminate the special privilege and return the industry to private enterprise, than 
the institution of banking rests within the public domain and they would take on 
the role as responsible managers. 
I 0 Some states during this period enacted free banking legislation and continued to 
issue charters; thus, maintaining a Dual Banking System. Three New England 
states enacted free banking laws: Vermont ( 1851) , Massachusetts (1851 ), and 
Connecticut (1852). There were few free banks entrants in the first two states, 
while there were several entrants in Connecticut. In these states most of the banks 
that entered chose to entered under the charter system. 
11 Ng (1998) contends that the free banking laws may have lowered political 
barriers, but raised economic barriers. 
12 Holt pp.235 . 
13 In 1836, a Maine Joint Standing Committee issued a report on the granting bank 
charters. The members contended that "banks now incorporated enjoy a 
monopoly of the privilege of supplying currency of the state" and that "the 
amount of bills (bank notes) would not be affected by the increase number of 
banks." Their reasoning for granting charters freely:" . .. that in every country, 
the currency will accommodate itself very nearly to the wants of the 
community ... " (ppl-3) This economic principle of monetary policy (free access) 
appeared to hold through the period. 
14 See Chadbourne ( 1936) pp 182-184. 
15 A brief sketch of Vermont's first free bank and their difficulties is given by 
Harper (1936) pages 32-34. 
16 Banks could avoid the legislature and increase capital through retained earnings. 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island listed retain earnings on 
their condition reports. These "surpluses" where designated for the payment of 
dividends. At times the distribution of dividends exceeded the level of retained 
earnings. (See the 1851 Massachusetts Bank Commissioner's Report, p 94 and 
Lamoreaux p.73) It does not appear that retained earnings was used as a source 
of capital during this period for two reasons. First, Attack and Rousseau (1999, p. 
156) found that earnings were distributed in order to maintain stock prices near 
par value and to signal to the market a healthy institution. Second, the use of 
14 
retained earnings did not qualify as capital and would provide limited benefits to 
the bank. Authorized capital was the only basis for bank-note circulation. 
17 Some economists might argue that political ideologies are strongly influenced by 
economic incentives. For instance, Sylla, Legler and Wallace (1987) found that 
during this period many states relied on charter banks as a significant source of 
state revenues. Thus, issuance of state charters may be linked to the demand for 
new revenues. 
18 These models applied the Friedman (1962) model of capital formation over time. 
19 During this period there was no branch banking or mergers in New England. 
20 Senate Documents, Massachusetts, No 85, March, 1853, p.8 
21 Ng (1988) has argued that the free banking laws may have been more restrictive 
and less profitable to operate. Forcing a petitioner to choose the free banking 
route would only result in negative political value for the legislator. 
22 In some cases, banks that were operating did not submit a report. When non-
reporting banks were found adjustments were made to the total number of banks 
operating, total bank capital, deposits, and bank notes. It was assumed that the 
bank's capital equaled last period's capital stock and that deposits and bank notes 
were issued at a rate equal to the industry averages of the deposit-capital, and 
bank note-capital ratios. 
23 A split in the Democrat party brought about the rise of the Republican Party. They 
were first elected to office in Maine in 1854 and in the other New England States 
between 1855 and 1857. The American (Know-Nothing) party captured the 
governor's office in three states for no more than 3 years. They were grouped with 
the Republican party since the northern branch of the American Party joined the 
Republican party in 1857. 
24 During this period the governors were elected annually. A four-year period was 
selected for two reasons. First, it allows for entry patterns to be established since 
it took about 9 months to a year for a bank to complete the requirements before 
operating. Second, the four-year pattern also coincides closely with two key 
downturns during the period: 1837 and 1857. 
25 Given the many differences in banking regulations, coefficients are likely to be 
different. 
26 Since deposits varied throughout the year and the condition reports were issued at 
different months of the year, deposits were seasonally adjusted. 
27 MacCauley's(1938) work provides data on commercial paper rate on a monthly 
basis from 1831 to 1860. The commercial paper rate for the month of the 
condition report was used. 
28 Only contiguous states are considered "neighboring states". 
29 This result runs counter to the conventional view that Massachusetts was a de 
facto competitive market. (See Dowd (1993, p.168-169) 
30 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, House Document, No. 33, January 22, 1853, 
pp. 1-15. 
31 See Edward Field , State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at the End 
of the Century: A History, Boston: Mason Publishing, Vol. 3, 1902, p 308. 
32 In 1846 New Hampshire enacted a general incorporation law, which allowed 
incorporation as a general right and not as a special privilege. One historian 
15 
observed that the New Hampshire "legislature responded promptly to the new 
laws and to the demands of industrialists. (Cole, 1970, p.2 12) 
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Table 1. 
The Years a Political Party Held the Governor's Office 
1836 to 1859 
State Democrat Whig Republican 
Connecticut 1836 - 1838 1838 - 1842 1857 - 1859 
(May) 1842 - 1844 1844 - 1846 
1846 - 1847 1847 - 1850 
1850 - 1854 1854- 1855 
#of Terms 10 10 2 
Maine 1836- 1837 1838 1855 
(January) 1839 - 1840 1841 1857 - 1859 
1842 - 1852 1853 
1856 
#of Terms 17 3 4 
Massachusetts 1840 1836 - 1839 1858- 1859 
(January) 1843 1841 - 1842 
1851 - 1852 1843 - 1849 
1853 - 1854 
#of Terms 4 15 2 
New 1836-1846 1846 - 1847 1857 - 1859 
Hampshire 1847 - 1855 
(June) 
#of Terms 17 I 3 
Rhode Island 1851 - 1854 1836 - 1851 1856- 1859 
(May) 1854- 1856 
#of Terms 3 17 4 
Vermont 1853 - 1854 1836- 1853 1855 - 1859 
(October) 1854- 1855 
#of Terms I 18 5 
American 
1855 - 1857 
2 
1855 - 1857 
3 
1855 - 1857 
2 
Note: Governors were elected annually. ( ) Month in which Governor entered 
office.Source: Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U.S. Elections, 3rct edition, 1994. 
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Table 2. 
Individual States Net Entry Rate Model New England 1836-1859 
Maine N.H. Mass Vermont R.l. Conn NY 
Intercept 0.89 -0.579 1.70 -0.361 -0.875 -0.152 0.884 
(0.91) (-0.92) (1.50) (-0.56) (-3.26)* (-0.35) (1 .67) 
Lagged 0.047 0.009 0.053 -0.007 0.009 0.059 0.032 
C.P.R (0.93) (0.20) (3 .29)* (-0 .20) <0.69) (2.64)** (0.84) 
Deposits 0.640 0.381 0.055 0.234 . 0.045 0.2 12 0.286 
(sa) (5.28)* (2.88)** (1.26) (3.83)* (1.61) ( 4.41)* (3.45)* 
Lagged -0.297 -0.182 -0.262 -0.117 0.082 -0.178 -0.188 
Capital (-3.10)* (-2.29)** (-2.06)** (-1.11) (1.58) (-2 . 70)** (-2.01)*** 
% tl. Assets -0.698 -0.494 -0.038 -0.261 -0.173 -0.450 -0.412 
IC> 
per Bank (-3.72)* (-2.70)** (-0.30) (-2.75)** (-2.89)** (-3.93)* (-2.23)** 
Lagged Reg -0.380 -0.083 0.044 -0.048 -0.027 0.011 -0.223 
Bank Notes (-2.99)* (-0.84) (1.97)*** (-1.01) (-1.73) <0.28) (-2.71)** 
Democrat 0.015 0.050 -0.043 0.000 0.067 -0.034 
(0.25) (-0.55) (-1 .95)*** (0.00) (4.39)* (-1.68) 
Republican -0.100 -.118 0.016 0.012 -0.103 -0.021 
(-1.38) (-0.92) (0.43) (0.20) (-4 . 76)* (-0.48) 
Free Bank NA NA 0.064 -0.062 NA 0.034 
Law (1.57) (-0.84) (0.97) 
Adi R2 .71 .57 .61 .39 .82 .60 .44 
D.W. 2.56 1.76 2.12 1.96 1.62 2.70 1.49 






Lagged C.P.R 0.025 
(0.41) 




Lagged Reg 0.048 





Free Bank NA 
Law 
Adj R1 .96 
AR(l) 1.04 
T-Stat 
Table 3: Individual States Capital Accumulation Model 
New England 1836-1859 
N.H. Mass Vermont R.I. Conn 
-1.36 2.14 -0.91 0.762 -0.656 
(-2.33) (1.57) (-1.34) (0.75) (-1.72) 
0.110 0.037 0.057 0.066 0.034 
(2.47)** (1.92)*** ( 1.58) (1.20) (1.78)*** 
0.145 0.029 0.162 0.028 0.066 
(1.11) (0.74) (2.80)** (0.26) (2.30)** 
0.916 0.720 0.996 0.672 0.889 
(12.16)* (5.76)* (8.98)* (3 .52)* (15.44)* 
0.080 0.046 -0.034 0.200 0.102 
(0.81) (2.17)** (-0.66) (3 .16)* (3.46)* 
-0.094 -0.036 0.024 0.073 -0.008 
(-0.98) (-1.68) (0.33) (1 .19) (-0.46) 
-0.140 -0.032 -0.033 0.024 -0.004 
(-1.06) (-0.71) (-0.53) (0.28) (-0.10) 
NA 0.148 -0.112 NA 0.033 
(3.04)* (-1.44) (1.06) 
.97 .99 .99 .95 .99 
-0.50 1.68 0.52 -0.16 0.49 
()are t-statistics. *, ** , *** denotes significance at the 1 %, 5%, 10% levels. 
NY 
-.039 
(0.07) 
0.023 
(0.57) 
0.130 
(1.90)*** 
0.833 
(8.90)* 
0.040 
(0.53) 
.96 
0.05 
